”
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9-799-139

R E V : J A N U A R Y 3 1 , 2 0 0 5

C Y N T H I A A .
M O N T G O M E R Y

Newell Company:
Corporate Strategy

Among
the many acquisitions that CEO John McDonough oversaw for Newell Company during
1998, two exemplify particularly important strategic steps for this broad-range
manufacturer of basic home and hardware products. The first was the acquisition
of Calphalon, a privately held manufacturer of anodized aluminum cookware.
Calphalon broadened Newells access to the department and specialty store
markets and extended the companys cookware product line to the top of the
market. The second was the acquisition of Rubbermaid, a manufacturer of plastic
consumer and commercial products with revenue of $2.4 billion versus Newells
$3.2 billion. The new company would be known as NewellRubbermaid and would have
a greater global presence and a broader product offering than Newell alone.

McDonough
viewed these acquisitions as part of the next phase of developing Newells
strategy, making a course correction, as he called it. In the face of the
increasing market power of Newells primary customers, the volume retailers,
McDonough saw a need to develop or buy stronger brands. Both Rubbermaid and
Calphalon brought strong brand names to Newell. In addition, McDonough felt
that the company had to continue to grow. Pointing to research that showed
companies with over $10 billion in market capitalization commanded higher
price/earnings multiples, he believed that it was critical for Newell to reach
this level of capitalization. As he said at the 1997 Annual Meeting, We
[Newell] are not big enough to get attention. With the Rubbermaid acquisition
Newells market value would cross the $10 billion threshold.

The Roots of
Strategy

Edgar
A. Newell bought the assets of a bankrupt manufacturer of brass curtain rods in
1902. At the time, Americans were just beginning to move out of cities to the
first suburbs, where people sought homes with extensive windowsboth to let
light in and to enjoy suburban views. Newells productbrass extension curtain
rodsmet with steadily increasing demand from the start.1

Newell
began by selling its product to small hardware stores, industrial builders, and
specialty retailers. As early as 1917, Newell became a regular supplier to the
then rapidly growing chain of Woolworth stores, gaining national distribution
and a solid reputation among national chain stores.

In
1921, Leonard Ferguson began his career at Newell, achieving the status of full
partner and owner in 1937. After receiving his MBA from Stanford in 1950,
Leonards son Daniel joined the
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1William
R. Cuthbert, Newell Companies: A Corporate History, 1983.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Research
Associate Elizabeth J. Gordon prepared this case under the supervision of
Professor Cynthia A. Montgomery. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis
for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources
of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. It is
a rewritten version of an earlier case, Newell Company: Acquisition Strategy,
HBS No. 794-066, prepared by Research Assistant Elizabeth Wynne Johnson under
the supervision of Professor David J. Collis.

Copyright
1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request
permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business
School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used
in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the permission of
Harvard Business School.

This document is authorized for use only
by Aj Krish in Strategy Summer 2015 for Travis Helm taught by Travis Helm, Ohio
State University – College of Education and Human Ecology from June 2015 to
August 2015.

For
the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

799-139 Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

company and became CEO
in 1965. At that time, Newell had revenues of approximately $10 million, a
limited product range based on curtain rods, and no articulated strategy for
the future. Dan Fergusons first task was to get control of Newells drapery rod
business. The business had been guided by what was essentially a product-line
strategy, selling drapery hardware to all channels including motels,
department stores, and in Europebut lacking anything to differentiate its
product. In an effort to overcome this problem, Newell acquired a small
window-shade manufacturer in 1966.

About this time,
Dan Ferguson attended a Young Presidents Organization meeting where he heard
Stanford Professor Bob Katz deliver a speech on strategy. Katzs ideas
resonated, but they slipped to the back of Fergusons mind until months later,
when he chanced to meet Katz on a plane. As they talked, Ferguson began to
develop a build on what we do best philosophy.2
Already selling extensively to Woolworths and to Kresge (later Kmart),
Ferguson foresaw the trend toward consolidation in the retail business and
envisioned a role for Newell: We realized we knew how to make a
high-volume/low-cost product and we knew how to relate to and sell to a large
retail institutionthe large mass retailer.3

In
July of 1967, Ferguson wrote out his strategy for Newell (Exhibit 1),
identifying its focus as the market for hardware and do-it-yourself (DIY)
products to volume merchandisers. In 1969 the company made its first
non-drapery hardware acquisition with Mirra-Cote bath hardware. This added a
new product line to the Newell family and opened up a relationship with Zayre,
a discount retailer that carried Mirra-Cotes products. In making the
acquisition, Newell hoped it would be possible to leverage the Zayre
relationship to sell other items as well.

Newell
went public in 1972, diluting what remained of the Newell family ownership.
Ferguson recalled the decision to go public as one that had to be made 100
percent, putting as much stock as possible up for sale to the public. Access
to the capital markets permitted Newell to begin aggressively adding new
products by acquisition.

Newell
thrived by following a disciplined and aggressive two-pronged strategy,
acquiring more than 30 major businesses in the next 20 years (Exhibits 2
and 3). To implement the strategy, Newell acquired companies that
manufactured low-technology, nonseasonal, noncyclical, nonfashionable products
that volume retailers would keep on the shelves year in and year out. Typically
these firms were underperforming due to high costs, and most had operating
margins of less than 10%. After acquisition, the companies were put through a
process of streamlining, focusing on operational efficiency and profitability.
This was widely known as Newellization. Since the businesses shared a
fundamental similarity, Newell believed that it could quickly compare their
income statements to its own, recognize where fundamentals of the cost
structures were misaligned, and reduce costs accordingly. The aim of these
changes was to raise operating margins above the 15% minimum Newell expected
from each of its businesses.

As
Newell assembled a multiproduct offering, it originally adhered to a strategy
of consolidation and centralization in order to achieve efficiencies. For
example, the firm had a functional rather than a divisional organization and
used a single sales force to sell all of its products.

Over
time, however, Newell underwent a major organizational transformation. The
system of centralized marketing proved not to be an effective approach to
selling a variety of products, and the company was reorganized into separate
divisions. Each division was individually responsible for
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2Personal
interview with William Sovey, April 23, 1993.
3Don
Longo, “”Ferguson Guides Newell to the Top . . .,”” Discount Store
News, vol. 28, no. 18, September 25, 1989, p. 82.
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2

This document is
authorized for use only by Aj Krish in Strategy Summer 2015 for Travis Helm
taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

For
the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

799-139

manufacturing and
marketing but was centrally controlled by corporate-run administrative, legal,
and treasury systems.

By
1997, the Newell Company had revenues of $3.23 billion (Exhibit 4). It
distributed a variety of consumer products primarily to mass merchandisers,
such as Wal-Mart; office superstores, such as Staples; and home centers, such
as Home Depot. That year, Newells top 10 customers accounted for approximately
40% of its sales volume (Exhibit 5). Wal-Mart alone represented 15% of
total sales. In addition to drapery hardware, blinds, and shades, Newell
products included do-it-yourself hardware products, such as torches and paint
brushes; home storage products, such as wire shelving; writing instruments and
markers; cookware; specialty glass; hair accessories; office storage products;
office organization products; and picture frames (Exhibit 6).

The
companys results have been impressive: through 1997 Newell had a 10-year
average return to investors of 31% versus an 18% yearly average for the S&P
500.

The
Elements of Strategy

Growth
by Acquisition

Profit growth,
not sales growth.

Newell Annual
Report, 1987

CEO
John McDonough had the main responsibility for the strategic direction of the
company and corporate business development. He looked for acquisitions that
would add value to Newells already powerful multiproduct offering and make
Newell a more important supplier for the worlds largest retailers. From the
corporate headquartersa small farmhouse on the border of Illinois and
WisconsinMcDonough maintained a stringent approach: redirect acquired
businesses to focus on their core product, and align them with Newells systems
and processes.

Company
president and chief operating officer Tom Ferguson (no relation to Dan
Ferguson) said, Anyone can talk about acquisitions and write the check, but to
make it work is a different story.4 Dan
Ferguson, who remained on the board of directors after his retirement from
active management, described the process of integrating new companies in the
following terms: 2+2 do not equal 4. If we do this right, we get more
than 4.

Beginning
immediately after a new acquisition, Newellization usually took place in less
than 18 months, and often in less than 6 monthstypically under the leadership
of a president and controller brought in by Newell from elsewhere in the
company. In that time, three categories of standard Newell systems were
introduced: an integrated financial system, a sales and order processing
system, and a flexible manufacturing system. Corporate teams, composed of a few
company executives, were assembled to centralize administration, accounting,
and customer-related financial aspects, consolidating the systems into a single
corporate computer system in Freeport, Illinois.

A
good example of the Newellization process was the purchase of Anchor Hocking, a
manufacturer of glassware and cabinet hardware, in 1987. Although Anchor
Hocking had sales of $757 million in 1986, compared with Newells $350 million,
Newell targeted it for takeover on the basis of its own vastly stronger profit
performance. At the time, Newell was enjoying an 11% profit margin, compared
with Anchors 0.5% margin. Newell management dismissed high-level Anchor
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4
Company interviews, January 7, 1999.
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3

This document is
authorized for use only by Aj Krish in Strategy Summer 2015 for Travis Helm
taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

For
the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

799-139 Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

executives, including
the chairman; reduced the total number of employees from 10,400 to about 9,000;
and closed one of three glass factories and the companys 25 retail stores.
They also slashed excess inventory and eliminated 40% of Anchors glass product
lines by year end, saving $32.4 million in costs. An additional $12 million was
saved by centralizing Anchor Hockings administrative, financial, and computer
functions under one roof at Newells administrative headquarters in Freeport.
Finally, Newell reduced the average length of time needed to fill a customer
order from 18 to 7 days.

Attractive
acquisition targets were companies that manufactured brand-name staple products
that ranked #1 or #2 in market share. Management believed that such products
would have the requisite amount of shelf space to be important to the retailer.
As one Newell executive noted, The most important asset in a new acquisition
is its shelf space.

The
company also acquired small businesses to round out its existing product lines
and consolidate industry capacity. The goal, however, was efficiency rather
than pricing power, as the most powerful customers could put a competitor back
into business as a counterweight to a strong supplier. Market rationalization
was also a benefit to Newell, because as company president Tom Ferguson noted,
Our worst competitor is one whos sick. That competitor will do anything for
cash flow, and it will destroy the market.

Newell
exited any business it deemed nonstrategic, even divesting businesses with
healthy profit margins if they were ill-suited to the companys main focus.
Home sewing products, for example, had seemed to fit Newell criteria. The Wm.
E. Wright company, a manufacturer of ribbons and home sewing products acquired
in 1985, had solid sales and profit performance. But the market for home sewing
was moving to small independent retailers, and the business dwindled out of
mass retail channels. Newell sold Wm. E. Wright in 1989, preferring to focus
the companys resources on businesses that better contributed to Newell by
making it more important to the mass retail customer. Dan Ferguson explained:
Back when we had four companies, adding a new one was a big deal. Now adding
one more . . . is not necessarily going to increase our power. We have to look
for a company that is powerful enough in itself to add something to the
package.5

Until the early
1990s Newells growth strategy was confined almost exclusively to the domestic
market. Beginning in 1994 with the acquisition of Cornings housewares business
in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the company entered foreign markets. By
1997 non-U.S. sales were 17% of Newells total revenue. The following year the
company acquired Rotring, a German manufacturer of writing instruments; Panex,
a cookware manufacturer in Brazil; and two European manufacturers of window
treatmentsGardinia and Swish. The combination with Rubbermaid would bring
international sales to 25% of the total.6
Globalization was part of the companys vision, and Newell was committed to
following its customers overseas. In a speech to management,7
McDonough noted that Newells customers were becoming global. For example,
Wal-Mart had acquired 95 stores in Germany, which it planned to operate like its
U.S. stores. As U.S. retailers became global competitors, Newell wanted to be
ready to serve them as a global supplier.
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5Daniel
Ferguson, personal interview, January 28, 1994.
6Robert
W. Baird & Co., investor presentation, February 1999.

7Management
meetings, February 1999.
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4

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taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

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the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

799-139

Serving
the Mass Retailer

Beginning
in the 1970s, the nature of the U.S. retail industry changed with the emergence
of large-scale mass retailers, whose size gave them considerable power over
their suppliers. By 1992, for example, three chains controlled roughly 70% of
the discount retailer market, and by 1997 the same three controlled 80%. At the
forefront of this new retail environment was Wal-Mart, whose $118 billion in
sales was four times as large as Kmart, the next largest mass merchandiser, and
more than twice as large as the largest department store, Sears (Exhibit 7).8
Wal-Mart not only had the influence to dictate the kind and quantity of
merchandise shipped to its stores, it also had considerable leverage over price
and scheduling, threatening to introduce a competitor to some stores as a way
of pressuring suppliers. As a result, manufacturers were forced to respond with
greater efficiencies in their warehouse and distribution systems, paring down
inventory and eliminating error. As one small manufacturer put it, They take
your guts out.9

Many
mass retailers relied on information technology as the foundation of their
business. As one observer noted: The power retailers have figured out a way of
converting raw data into insight.10
As a supplier, Newell had invested heavily in the necessary computer and
communications hardware to match its customers demands. Newells top 20
customers placed 90% of their orders through Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
the companys sophisticated electronic management system for transmitting
purchase orders, invoices, and payments to and from its retail partners across
the country. Orders and data sent from customers to the companys central
computer in Freeport, Illinois, were processed and then downloaded to all the
divisions. The divisions used this data to schedule their own production and
deliveries, allowing retailers to maintain minimal stock levels in line with
actual sales. Said Tom Ferguson: The company is built on a solid base of
performance. By performance, I mean shipping goods, getting them on the
counter, and keeping the hooks full. Thats the name of the game. Generally
speaking, retailers needed this service on a national basis.

As
technology improved over time, the top three mass merchandisers along with many
others began providing Newell with nightly point-of-sale data on every product
sold the previous day. These retailers expected suppliers to use this data to
plan manufacturing and shipping schedules in order to reduce inventory. By 1998
some began to use a system known as cross-docking. This was a means for retailers
such as Wal-Mart to eliminate inventory other than at the store level.
Suppliers were required to ship to the companys central warehouse where an
automated system distributed the delivery directly from the loading dock to
trucks going to the individual stores. This system required on-time delivery of
the correct order, as there was no inventory buffer with which to complete an
order. If the shipment was not on time, there was no second chancethe trucks
to the stores were gone. Claiming that unfilled orders were lost sales, some
retailers began charging suppliers the gross profit (or full margin) on missed
shipments. Often, these charges were deducted from payments automatically and
were nonnegotiable.

To
address these pressures, Newell focused each division on a single goal:
furnishing product and service to mass retailers. Each division was to place
primary emphasis on its own profit performance, in the belief that this would
force the division to provide superior customer service. In the 1970s, the
industry average for first-pass line-fill (the measure of stock available when
an order was received) was 80%. Newells goal at the time was to keep its
customers at 95% line-fill and 95% on-time delivery. As improvements later
pushed the industry average higher, Newells standard rose to nearly 100%.
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8
Top 100 Retailers:1-25, Chain Store Age State of the Industry Supplement,
August 1998, p. 3Aff.
9″”Clout!
More and More, Retail Giants Rule the Marketplace,”” Business Week,
December 21, 1992, p. 67.
10
Ibid.
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5

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authorized for use only by Aj Krish in Strategy Summer 2015 for Travis Helm
taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

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the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

799-139 Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

Newell vied to
be the no problem supplier in the industry. As one executive noted, a
frequently asked question in the industry was Do you ship as well as Newell?
While the company enjoyed a solid reputation for its service, sub-par
performance by a newly acquired business could easily damage that reputation.
As Dan Ferguson observed, The retailer knows Newell by our worst performer, so
we cant afford to have one dog in the show.11 The
key was to get the service level in new acquisitions up to Newells standards
as quickly as possible; to that end, the company was willing to carry larger
inventories immediately following an acquisition.

Consistent
with its high service level, Newells pricing was not the lowest in the
industry. Rather, it designed its products to fit a certain price point and
then delivered consistently, in both product and service quality. In the late
1980s marketing representatives came prepared to show the customer the
companys report card on several dimensions of service quality as evidence of
a products value, even if prices reflected an apparent 5% to 10% premium. By
1998 Wal-Mart had developed its own version of the report card which it used
with all suppliers.

Despite
its size and the breadth of products it sold to the mass retailers, Newell
maintained distinct identities across its 21 separate divisions (Exhibit 8).
The retailer therefore dealt with separate sales teams for each Newell
product-line it carried, although Wal-Mart, for example, may have preferred to
deal with a single contact.

The
Corporate Role

Like
everything else we do to market to the mass retailer, the more they see us as
an effective partner, the better the edge we have when a certain product comes
up for review.12

Newell
maintained centralized administration at the corporate level, making it clear
that basic functionslegal and tax issues, benefits, EDI, credit and
collection, and financial control systems would be their responsibility. The
corporate charge to the divisions was 2% of sales. Top financial
responsibilities were divided between two corporate executives: the Vice
President-Finance, who focused on outside asset and liability management, and
the Senior Vice President, Corporate Controller, who focused on internal
operations. Both positions reported directly to the company president, who in
turn reported to the CEO. Separate divisions reported to group presidents, one
level below the company president.

Acquisitions
were pursued at the corporate level, on the understanding that the various
divisions were not to be distracted from their core function: generating
profit. Total corporate staff was 375, with about 360 in the administrative
headquarters in Freeport and 15 at the corporate headquarters in Beloit. Most
of the top management team had been with the company for more than 15 years.

The
divisions were to handle design, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and service,
as well as merchandising to the customer. Management stressed the goal of
creating lean, efficient contributors to the Newell strategy: If you have an
opportunity to make a product line into a profit unit, the smaller you can make
that unit, the more entrepreneurial drive you have.13
Although Newell encouraged its new businesses to pursue growth, Newell would
not permit a division to redefine itself. Each business unit adhered to a
specific and disciplined strategy, with permission to develop
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11Ibid.

12Daniel
Ferguson quoted in Holt Hackney, “”Strategic Alliances,”” Financial
World, October 29, 1991, p. 22.

13Mary
Ann Bacher, The Newell Force in Housewares, HFD: The Weekly Home
Furnishings Newspaper, (5), January 11, 1988, p. 1.
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6

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taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

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Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

799-139

but not to expand its
core product focus. For example, E-Z Paintr made hand-held paint applicators,
i.e., paint brushes and rollersnot power sprayers or step ladders. Similarly,
when the Wright Co. had wanted to add knitting patterns to its product line,
the idea was rejected because patterns did not constitute a volume, staple
line.

Representatives
from Newell sought to interface with the retail customer at all levels of
management. CEO McDonough maintained communication with the top people at
Wal-Mart and other major customers, as did Tom Ferguson. Two trade relations
executives knew all their retail customers vice presidents, but they never
sold Newells products; as one executive remarked, their job was to sell
Newell. Vested with the duty to run each entity as an entrepreneurial unit,
division presidents functioned as their own chief marketing officers. They
interfaced directly with their customers and maintained regular contacts with the
retail chains buyers. The company attached great importance to customer
relations, frequently inviting buyers for plant visits that, in some
communities, served as an occasion for planned celebrations with local
officials in attendance. In addition, Newell involved its major customers in a
process of shared planning and development.

Newell
insisted upon holding customers strictly to the terms it laid out. The
companys 2%-30-net-45 payment agreements were not negotiable. Acquired
companies often had been allowing major customers to pay on 90-day terms;
Newell eliminated this practice immediately, which resulted in savings on
accounts receivable. Nor did any division president have authorization to allow
a cash discount without corporate approval, even to his or her largest
customers, except for preapproved campaigns. To Newells executives, this
inflexibility was simply a matter of discipline. The policy defended Newell
against the protestations of smaller retailers such as hardware stores, who didnt
like to see mass discounters such as Home Depot carrying the same brands for
less. Newell also refused to bow to some retailers demands that it serve them
exclusively.

Management
incentives both reflected and drove the corporate culture. Salary was based on
a uniform system across all divisions, rewarding individuals on the basis of
their positions and the size of their divisions. Managers received a base
salary that was equal to the industry average, but could look forward to
bonuses ranging from a maximum of 33% for the most junior manager of a
divisions 20-person executive team, to 100% for division presidents. The
bonuses were based on division performance alone, and the culture encouraged
competition by convening managers for award ceremonies to honor top performers.
Stock options, an additional form of incentive made available when the company
went public, were granted according to a formula based on salary and position.
Historically, the companys system for evaluating yearly bonuses focused exclusively
on pre-tax ROA. The goals were highbeginning at 32.5% pre-tax ROA and reaching
the maximum payout at 43.5% and standard across all divisions.

In
1990, Newell altered its bonus structure by adding a bonus for internal growth
on top of existing ROA goals. Although in 1989 the company had a banner year in
terms of profitability, internal growth lagged. Management recognized that,
over the long run, the company needed a more sound balance. One top executive
noted: There are years when you can increase earnings more than you increase
sales, but you cant do that year after year. In 1991, Newell achieved 6%
internal growth with new products, but maintaining this rate remained a
challenge throughout the 1990s.

Given
the potential for rewards, demand for positions at Newell was high. For
management-level hires the company sought people who would be motivated by
success and a lucrative bonus system. Applicantsmostly mid-level executives
from other consumer goods companieswere screened for these particular
management traits with a personality test and put through an intensive
application process that only 1 in 10 passed. Each newly hired company employee
underwent a two day training
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7

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taught by Travis Helm, Ohio State University – College of Education and Human
Ecology from June 2015 to August 2015.

For
the exclusive use of A. Krish, 2015.

799-139 Newell
Company: Corporate Strategy

program in the Newell
corporate culture. The so-called Newell University stressed product focus and
profit-orientationthe underpinnings of Newellization.

Career
paths featured frequent transfers and promotions. Among the top 250 managers,
the yearly transfer rate was above 10%, with many moving across five or more
divisions in a career. Even division presidents had an average tenure of less
than 10 years in any one positiona reflection of the number of acquisitions
and the possibility of moving from smaller to larger divisions. Executives
generally were responsible for charting their own career paths. Job openings
were publicized within the company, although corporate HR rarely took a
pro-active role in filling them. Instead, divisional managers could directly
choose from among the candidates. McDonough and Ferguson participated in
decisions regarding the top 100 people, reaching to one level below division
president.

Several
times a year, division leaders convened for presidents meetings. These, in
addition to regular encounters at trade shows, kept leadership across divisions
apprised as to what was going on elsewhere in the company. Annual management
meetings brought together functional VPs for sales and marketing; operations;
personnel; accounting and control; and customer service from all 21 divisions.
Each group had its own two-day meeting, featuring presentations and programs
aimed at transferring learning.

Corporate
purchasing took place under the direction of a liaison from corporate services.
The divisions could get together with one another to establish a contract and
coordinate purchasing of shared items. However, the amount of corporate
purchasing was limited.

To
maintain its profit focus, the company adhered to a strict set of monthly
financial reviews. These meetings were administered by divisional controllers,
key members of the management team who also reported directly to the corporate
controller as well as to their respective divisional presidents. Newells
financial control system was tailored to the key success factors of businesses
selling low-tech, long life-cycle products to mass retailers. The system used
variable budgeting that adjusted expense items in line with aggregate sales,
specifically addressing 30 items. Variances were bracketed, and too many
variances would lead to a bracket meeting. Even if sales were above budget,
if the flexed cost numbers showed an unfavorable variance, intervention would
follow. If necessary, the budget would be changed and that division would be
held strictly to the adjusted level. Newell preferred to commit division heads
to a real budget using words like con”